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Abstract
eCommerce transaction frauds keep changing rapidly. This is the major issue
that prevents eCommerce merchants having a robust machine learning model for
fraudulent transactions detection. The root cause of this problem is that rapid
changing fraud patterns alters underlying data generating system and causes
the performance deterioration for machine learning models. This phenomenon
in statistical modeling is called “Concept Drift”. To overcome this issue, we pro-
pose an approach which adds dynamic risk features as model inputs. Dynamic
risk features are a set of features built on entity profile with fraud feedback.
They are introduced to quantify the fluctuation of probability distribution of
risk features from certain entity profile caused by concept drift. In this paper,
we also illustrate why this strategy can successfully handle the effect of concept
drift under statistical learning framework. We also validate our approach on
multiple businesses in production and have verified that the proposed dynamic
model has a superior ROC curve than a static model built on the same data
and training parameters.
Keywords: fraud detection system, concept drift, entity profile, fraud feedback
1. Introduction
In the eCommerce industry, Fraud Detection Systems (FDSs) play an im-
portant role when the online fraud is increasing and spreading rapidly. Online
purchases are made on a, known as, Card Not Present (CNP) environment,
where no physical cards or cardholder signatures are required. This provision
of convenience, however, also generates a fertile ground for cybercrime. In CNP
scenario, fraudsters only need to provide credit/debit card information to ex-
ecute a purchase. If the purchase is made successfully by a fraudster, once
identified, the legitimate cardholder can file a dispute (i.e. chargeback) to the
∗Corresponding author
Email addresses: mhuiying@vt.edu (Huiying Mao), yungliu@microsoft.com (Yung-wen
Liu), yutjia@microsoft.com (*Yuting Jia), Jay.Nanduri@microsoft.com (Jay Nanduri)
Preprint submitted to Journal of ESWA October 11, 2018
ar
X
iv
:1
81
0.
04
65
4v
1 
 [s
tat
.A
P]
  1
0 O
ct 
20
18
card issuing bank. For CNP transactions, merchants are also required to be re-
sponsible for the fraud financial liability. Therefore, an effective fraud detection
system is essential for the eCommerce merchants. The system needs to be able
to distinguish legitimate transactions from fraudulent ones and make prompt
decisions (reject/approve) as required most of the time.
A simplified flowchart of a fraud detection system is depicted in Figure 1.
Given an online purchase, a FDS can approve, reject or send the transaction
to the manual review team, if applicable. The decision is made based on the
risk score estimated using a machine learning (ML) model. Different decisions
result in different types of feedback, which are constantly looped into the FDS for
the model performance improvement. There are three types of fraud feedback.
Different types of feedback have different delay schedules and provide different
confidence levels indicating the true status of the transaction (either legitimate
or fraudulent)
Figure 1: Mechanism flowchart of an FDS.
(i) Chargeback: this type of feedback often returns late. It could take up to
several weeks or months starting from the legitimate cardholders filing the
dispute to the time when merchants really receive the chargeback request.
The transactions that end up with a chargeback request are often labeled
as fraudulent transactions by the merchants.
(ii) Manual review (MR) decisions: this type of feedback usually returns rang-
ing from several minutes to a few hours. Although the decision made MR
can be subjective, but MR rejections can be considered as a fraudulent sig-
nal with a high level of confidence. Depending on budget constraints and
practical needs, not every eCommerce business has human investigators,
so not every FDS can have this type of feedback.
(iii) System rejects: this is almost real-time from the FDS. The decision is
made automatically without additional reviews. Therefore, the reliabil-
ity of this type of feedback may be doubtful and need to be used more
carefully. However, in practice, a customer can always escalate for the
wrongful rejection by contacting the customer service. The final decisions
made by customer service can be later used for the model evaluation and
performance improvement.
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The behaviors of legitimate customers and fraudsters keep evolving over
time either intentionally or unintentionally. For example, the behavior of the
customers may change abruptly due to the launch of marketing promotion,
advertising, and new products. However, the behavior of online fraudsters tend
to adapt even more quickly. As soon as online merchant adapts new strategy to
prevent fraud, the online fraudsters may easily find another weakness/loophole
to exploit or they could alternatively focus their attention elsewhere. Therefore,
compared with traditional classification problems, the FDSs have more challenge
to overcome for eCommerce merchants.
Due to the aforementioned scenario, the stream drawn from transactions in
an eCommerce application is commonly not stationary, that is, the data are not
drawn from a fixed distribution. This phenomenon is called ?concept drift?, and
there is a wealth of research devoted to this topic; see (Andrea Dal Pozzolo and
Bontempi, 2015, 2018; Joao Gama, 2013; Jing Gao, 2007; Gregory Ditzler and
Polikar, 2015) and references therein.
In a non-stationary or drifting environment, a non-adaptive model that is
trained under the false stationary assumption would not perform well or even fail
completely at worst. There has been a need for efficient and adaptive algorithms
for learning in a drifting environment since the beginning of machine learning,
and now is ever increasing driven by the big-data phenomenon witnessed in
the past decade. Research work related to learning with concept drift has also
been growing and many drift-aware adaptive learning algorithms have been
developed. Some similar adaptive strategies have been developed independently
under different names in different contexts. There are two primary families
of strategies referred to as active and passive approaches (Elwell and Polikar,
2011). Active approaches have a detection mechanism of the changes in the data
distribution, which activates an adaption once certain thresholds are reached.
Passive approaches constantly update the model without requiring an explicit
detection mechanism.
While there have been many excellent research works done on adaptive learn-
ing in a general setting, not much published works have addressed real life
machine learning in the challenging eCommerce environment. We list some
challenges (not inclusive) here.
(i) A decision has to be made in a blink of second (typically 20-1000 millisec-
onds) with high accuracy. In practice, if it takes the FDS too long to make
a decision for a purchase, the system may have a timeout and generally the
transaction is approved. This opens a gate for fraudsters. If the response
time is short and the decision is made with high inaccuracy, the result is
costly, too. If too many fraudulent transactions are approved inline and
many chargebacks are filed later, this definitely could incur a huge loss
to the merchants. If too many legitimate transactions are rejected, the
customers may choose to shop elsewhere or the customer service has to
handle high volume of escalation calls. In the presence of manual reviews,
if the review agents are flooded with a huge volume of transactions, and
their review quality will suffer. When the fraud attack happens at the
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worst time such during holiday season or the fraud detection system halts
due to a failure in software or hardware, it would no doubt exacerbate the
situation
(ii) The behavior of fraudster often changes very rapidly by exploiting an
vulnerability of an FDS such as using stealing payment instruments from
legitimate customers to make a huge volume of purchases within a short
time period.
(iii) For the active strategy to work, an effective and efficient detection system
with rapid change in the data distribution often involves high computation
cost and thus might not be justified in the revenue gained.
The motivation for this research stemmed from many years of handing con-
cept drift in industry and also from the drawbacks of the current fraud detection
systems. Our main contribution in this paper is to provide an effective solution
to tackle the typical challenges in the eCommerce industry, that was mentioned
in the previous paragraphs. Different from the existing approaches, we propose
a new method that uses dynamic risk features to track the concept drift and
further build a dynamic model. Our strategy is to quantify concept drift by
using an entity profile with fraud feedback. This entity profile continues be-
ing updated by consuming fraud feedback signals. The statistics derived from
the entity profile are then used as input features at both training and scoring
stages. This approach enables the machine learning model to be self-adaptive
during concept drift. Instead of focusing on model architecture and training
methodology in the existing literature, we focus more on those features that
can effectively adapt to concept drift in an eCommerce industry. By keeping
relatively fewer features, we can detect changes in data stream without incurring
high computational cost. The results were validated in production environment
and we found that models built with this approach could effectively handle
concept drift. In essence, our proposed approach is a delicate combination of
both active and passive strategies for learning in a nonstationary environment.
In addition, the experiment conducted using real data in a production setting
showed that models thus built were scalable and robust.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief
explanation of concept drift. Section 3 gives a brief summary of approaches to
adaptive learning algorithms. Section 4 introduces three types of dynamic risk
features, and details the dynamic modeling strategy for handling concept drift.
The results of applying our model to real data are shown in section 5. Section
6 concludes this paper with a few remarks and speculation on future research.
2. Concept Drift
In this section, we will first describe a fraud detection machine learning
problem in the environment where the concept drift issue exists. Followed by
specifying the root cause of concept drift, we will discuss why the existence of
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concept drift has some negative impact on the performance of static models.
Lastly, various statistics used to track and quantify concept drift will be dis-
cussed. We refer to (Joao Gama, 2013) for a comprehensive survey on concept
drift adaptions and to (Geoffrey I. Webb and Petitjean, 2016) for quantitative
analysis of drift.
2.1. Definition of concept drift and two scenarios
Concept drift is a phenomenon when the underlying data generating system
changes over time (Elwell and Polikar, 2011). We denote the features of a
transaction as X and the status of this transaction as Y . X is a p-dimension
random vector, where p is the number of features that describe this transaction.
Examples of features can be “product name”, “purchase dollar amount”, “device
type”, and so forth. Y is a binary variable whose value is either 1 or 0, indicating
the transaction status being fraudulent or legitimate. Concept drift is said to
occur when
||pt+1(X,Y )− pt(X,Y )|| > δ, (1)
where pt represents the joint probability density function (PDF) of X and Y at
time t, time t + 1 refers to the next timestamp, || · || is a norm to measure the
difference between the two density functions, and δ is a pre-defined threshold.
Such a data generating system with underlying concept drift is also referred as
non-stationary environment (NSE) in the literature (e.g., (Ditzler and Polikar,
2013)).
We use p(X|Y ), a conditional PDF that gives the conditional probability of
X given Y , to describe the likelihood of presence of transaction features. For
purchases made by good customers, the distribution of transaction features is
p(X|Y = 0). Similarly, the distribution of transaction features from fraudsters
is described by p(X|Y = 1). Because of
p(X,Y ) = p(X|Y )p(Y ), (2)
the fluctuation of joint PDF in (2) is originated from the fluctuations of p(Y )
and p(X|Y ). We can divide concept drift into two scenarios:
(i) pt+1(Y ) 6= pt(Y ): the overall population distribution shifts between good
customers and fraudsters at the different time points?t and t + 1. For
example, under economic prosperity at time t, higher portion of purchases
are made by good users compared with the regular economic status at
time t + 1 . For another example, fraudsters test the FDS constantly.
When they find a loophole in the system, they would place much more
orders. As a result, the percentage of fraudulent transactions jumps. In
other words, the good/bad purchase volume distribution change leads to
the variation in pt(Y ) with respect to time t.
(ii) pt+1(X|Y = y) 6= pt(X|Y = y): the shopping features of good customers
p(X|Y = 0) or fraudsters p(X|Y = 1) at time t + 1 differs from their
shopping features at time t. For instance, customers adjust their purchase
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behavior from product A to product B after an advertising campaign;
fraudsters heavily attack a certain product when the product is popular
in the market.
These two scenarios are not necessarily mutually exclusive. They often occur
simultaneously.
2.2. Performance degradation of static model
Supervised learning models, where the status of the subject is known, are
commonly applied by a FDS. Classified and Regression Trees (CART), Neural
Network model, and Support Vector Machine (SVM) are the most commonly
used classifiers . In supervised learning, the properties of conditional PDF
p(Y |X) is of the most interest (Jerome Friedman and Tibshirani, 2001). Under
concept drift, p(Y |X) may or may not change based on
p(Y |X) = p(X,Y )
p(X)
, (3)
Literature categorizes concept drift into “real” and “virtual” versions based on
the existence of fluctuation in p(Y |X); see (Joao Gama, 2013; Jing Gao, 2007;
T. Ryan Hoens and Chawla, 2012; Mark G. Kelly and Adams, 1999):
(i) Real concept drift if pt+1(Y |X) 6= pt(Y |X).
(ii) Virtual drift if pt+1(Y |X) = pt(Y |X).
This paper focuses on handling real concept drift. In the following context,
unless specified, ?concept drift? refers to “real concept drift”.
The objective of having machine learning model in a fraud detection system
is that to use this model M to effectively estimate the conditional probability,
i.e.
M(X) ∝ p(Y = 1|X). (4)
M outputs a score or a probability, which measures the risk level of the trans-
action. That is, given enough volume of stationary historical transactions, a
sophisticated learning algorithm is used to estimate the probability of a trans-
action with features x being fraudulent P (Y = 1|X = x), where x is generated
from the same stationary environment. For notation simplicity, from now on
P (Y = 1|X = x) will be denoted as px(Y = 1).
When concept drift happens, without taking this factor into account, the
probability of a transaction with features x generated at time t+ 1 being fraud-
ulent, px,t+1(Y = 1), is wrongly predicted by px,t(Y = 1). In other words,
supposeMt is a model trained based on historical data with fraud labels up to
time t:
{Yt,Xt}, (5)
where Xt represents the set of all transactions and Yt represents the set of
corresponding labels. For a new transaction with feature x generated at time
t+ 1,
Mt(x) ∝ px,t(Y = 1) 6= px,t+1(Y = 1). (6)
6
The inequality is the root cause of incorrect prediction. In this paper, such
a model without concept drift handling strategy is referred as “static model”.
Due to concept drift, model performs much worse than expected. ROC
curve in Figure 2 shows an example of comparison between in-time prediction
(blue) and offline prediction (orange) from one of our business portfolios. In-
time means that model performance is evaluated on a dataset that shares the
same time range with training dataset; offline refers to that the test dataset is
collected outside the training dataset time range.
Figure 2: Performance degradation of static model.
3. Survey of Adaptive Algorithms
In this section, we give a brief summary of approaches and algorithms that
address concept drift issues which are mostly relevant to this paper. We recom-
mend articles (Tsymbal, 2004; Joao Gama, 2013; Gregory Ditzler and Polikar,
2015) for a comprehensive treatment.
Fraud detection systems in the eCommerce use adaptive learning algorithms
to process high-speed flows of stream data. Based on whether there is a mecha-
nism to detect change in data distribution, adaptive algorithms for learning in
the presence of concept drift are primary based on active or passive approach.
Active algorithms detect concept drift, and passive algorithms constantly up-
date the model with new data, regardless whether drift is present.
In an active approach that handles concept drift, there are two phrases:
change detection and adaption. The change detection mechanism rarely oper-
ates directly on raw data, but instead on independent features that are often
based domain expert knowledge, and are extracted from incoming data stream.
Once a change is detected, the classifier needs to adapt to the change from the
newly available information and to discard obsolete ones. The adaption can be
done through windowing, weighting or random sampling (Gregory Ditzler and
Polikar, 2015).
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In the literature, two main approaches for change detection had been pro-
posed and adopted, which differ for the different entity in analysis: based on
form of distributions of the input data, and based on the classification error.
The first approach detects the change in the jointed pdf structure. The second
approach evaluates variations in the classification error on supervised data, and
the classification accuracy uses a fixed threshold or an adaptive one (Joa˜o Gama
and Rodrigues, 2004). In both cases, a change is detected as soon as the clas-
sifier’s accuracy falls below the threshold. The first approach assesses the drift
of the pdf of the inputs disregarding their label values (Cesare Alippi, 2008).
A combination of both approaches was proposed in (Cesare Alippi, 2012).
The proposed solution assesses the stationary in both the joint probability den-
sity function of the labeled data and the distribution of the inputs on unlabeled
data. Dal Pozzolo et al. treated immediate feedback samples and delayed sam-
ples, whose labels are obtained only after some time, separately. They suggested
to trained two distinct classifiers based on each type of feedback respectively,
and then aggregate the outputs (Andrea Dal Pozzolo and Bontempi, 2015). Gao
et al. proposed a method which uses an ensemble of classifiers built on sequen-
tial chucks of training samples to handle concept drift. In their approach, each
classifier is trained on a short period of time and updated frequently (Jing Gao,
2007).
4. Model with dynamic risk features
In this paper, we propose a dynamic model that can overcome the model
performance degradation caused by concept drift. Our strategy is to incorporate
concept drift measures as dynamic risk features into model training and scoring.
By design, the model learns not only from the original static features but also
from dynamic risk features, which provide an effective measurement of concept
drift. As a result, the model self-adapts when concept drifts happen. This
approach saves the effort to constantly retrain the model for preventing the
performance degradation.
4.1. Measuring concept drift using entity profile with fraud feedback
As shown in Section 2, concept drift can be measured using the variation
on p(Y ), p(X|Y ) and p(Y |X). Therefore, to track concept drift, we need to
consistently monitor the probability distributions with respect to time t and to
estimated pt(Y ), pt(X|Y ), pt(Y |X). However, the estimates of pt(Y ), pt(X|Y ),
pt(Y |X) are not the adequate measurement for concept drift since they are
the instantaneous measures and could vary from the norm most of them time.
Therefore, in our study, we use the average probabilities within a sliding win-
dow as surrogates, and the average probabilities are approximated by frequency
ratios.
To formulate the methodology: let pt = p(t) denotes the probability of
interest at time t, which changes over time. The average probability p¯t,h, the
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surrogate of p(t), is defined as
p¯t,h =
∫ t
t−h p(t)dt
h
, (7)
where h is the length of a sliding window. The p¯t,h is approximated through
some statistics ft,h by the law of large numbers. That is,
ft,h ≈ p¯t,h, lim
h→0
p¯t,h = pt, (8)
and thus
lim
h→0
ft,h ≈ pt. (9)
The length of the sliding window needs to be chosen carefully. It should
be long enough to have a good sample size for reliable estimation, while short
enough to be sensitive to the fluctuation. Our approach is to use two sliding
windows with lengths of h and H (h < H). That is, at time t, fˆ statistics are
calculated based on the transactions happened within the shortt-term time span
[t− h, t) and long-term time span [t−H, t), respectively. Later discussion will
illustrate the statistics calculation only on short-term time span, as that for the
long-term span is very similar.
4.1.1. Using overall fraud rate (FR) to measure pt(Y )
By definition,
pt(Y ) =
{
P (Y = 1|t) if Y = 1,
1− P (Y = 1|t) if Y = 0; (10)
and P (Y = 1|t) is estimated by overall fraud rate (FR) within the time window
[t− h, t), which is defined as
overall FRt =
# of fraudulent transactions within time window [t− h, t)
# of total transactions within time window [t− h, t) .
(11)
Besides overall FRt, overall dollar-weighted fraud rate ($FR) is also a suitable
candidate to be included as a dynamic risk feature:
overall $FRt =
$ of fraudulent transactions within time window [t− h, t)
$ of total transactions within time window [t− h, t) .
(12)
Overall $FRt does not directly estimate P (Y = 1|t), but it puts more weights
on higher dollar value transactions and helps model to learn the fraud pattern
change.
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Figure 3: Overall fraud rate with respect to time for one business partner.
Figure 3 shows overall fraud rate calculated on the long-term sliding window
(left) and short-term sliding window (right). The solid lines are calculated at
time t. There is a varied time delay before receiving the chargeback signal. We
also draw the final fraud rates (dash lines), which are calculated offline when
this study was conducted, for comparison. These two lines follow the same
trending pattern. This justifies Formula (8). The difference between the solid
and dashed lines diminishes because that more recent transactions have higher
percentage of chargebacks having not been received yet when plotting them.
4.1.2. Using fraud rate of each transaction entity FRt(E) to measure pt(Y |X)
In practice, a transaction entity EX is often described by a set of features,
X. Therefore, we propose measuring the fraud rates profiled on important
features. Suppose EX is the transaction entity with associated features: X =
{x1, x2, · · · }. Within the time window [t − h, t), the number of good and bad
transactions and their dollar amounts for each transaction entity and marginal
totals are shown in Table 1.
Table 1: Transaction count and dollar amount distribution profiled on entity EX within time
window [t− h, t)
x1 x2 · · · Total
Bad(Y=1) N11($11) N21($21) · · · N·1($·1)
Good(Y=0) N10($10) N20($20) · · · N·0($·0)
Total N1·($1·) N2·($2·) · · ·
Ni1($i1) represents the number (dollar amount) of fraudulent transaction
with feature xi, i = 1, 2, · · · ; Ni0($10), within time window [t−h, t). Ni0($i0) are
for the number (dollar amount) of good transactions with feature xi, i = 1, 2, · · · ,
within the sample period. Their marginal totals are calculated by
N·j =
∑
i
Nij , j = 0, 1;Ni· = Ni0 +Ni1, i = 1, 2, · · · (13)
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$·j =
∑
i
$ij , j = 0, 1; $i· = $i0 + $i1, i = 1, 2, · · · (14)
Thus, the fraud rates and dollar weighted fraud rates for entity E within time
window [t− h, t) are:
FRt(xi) =
Ni1
Ni·
, i = 1, 2, · · · (15)
$FRt(xi) =
$i1
$i·
, i = 1, 2, · · · (16)
They are the risk features used to measure pt(Y |X).
Figure 4 shows the fraud rates of a selected object. For example, we can
select ?product name? as the entity and one particular product as the selected
object. Red line is the fraud rate calculated by 4-week sliding windows and the
black line is for 8-week sliding windows. As we can see, this object is under
attack around the November 2016. FR calculated within the 4-week sliding
window is more sensitive to fraud attack. When the short-term FR is higher than
long-term FR, it indicates that fraudsters are attacking this product recently.
On the other hand, if short-term FR is lower, it means fraudsters divert their
attention to the other products. Also, the difference between long-term FR and
short-term FR reflects the fraud attack severity.
Figure 4: Entity profiled fraud rate for a selected object.
4.1.3. Using Weight of Evidence on features of entities, (WoE(XE`)), ` =
1, 2, . . . to measure pt(X|Y )
Similarly,
pt(X|Y ) =
{
P (X|Y = 1, t) if Y = 1,
P (X|Y = 0, t) if Y = 0; (17)
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and X is high-dimensional. We propose to use the estimation of
ln
[pt(XE` |Y = 1)
pt(XE` |Y = 0)
]
(18)
to measure pt(X|Y ). The estimation is known as Weight of Evidence (WoE) in
credit risk modeling (Anderson, 2007), formulated by
WoEt(xi) = ln
[Ni1/N·1
Ni0/N·0
]
, i = 1, 2, · · · , (19)
$ WoEt(xi) = ln
[$i1/$·1
$i0/$·0
]
, i = 1, 2, · · · , (20)
where Ni1($i1), Ni0($10) are the count and dollar amount for bad and good
transactions happened within time window [t− h, t) as shown in Table 1.
For a particular entity feature value xi,WoE(xi) is the difference between
the log of odds ratios of xi and that of the overall population:
WoE(xi) = ln
[Ni1/N·1
Ni0/N·0
]
= ln
[Ni1
Ni0
]
− ln
[N·1
N·0
]
. (21)
Therefore, when WoE(xi) > 0, the odds of xi being fraudulent feature is
higher than the average; when WoE(xi) < 0, the odds of xi being fraudulent
feature is lower compared to the average. That is to say, WoE provides an
indication of fraudsters? attacking target feature.
For example, in Figure 5, among 10 products A-J in the market: Product B
is targeted by fraudsters on March 1st where its WoE is above zero. But as time
goes by, Product B is no longer the attack object; instead, Product G becomes
the attack target on April 15.
Figure 5: Snapshots of long-term and short-term WoE distribution for 10 products.
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One final note for this subsection is that the selection of features is pivotal.
Important features could include product name, account email domain, billing
country, merchant name, and so forth. An feature should be selected such
that the number of feature values should not be too few or too many. If too
few, the feature value is too broad to have the probability fluctuation to show
up. For example, if “market country” is chosen as the feature, then fraudster
attack different product within the same country won?t appear in the tracking.
Likewise, it should not have too many feature values. Otherwise, the frequency
ratio approximations for each feature would be unstable.
4.2. Measuring concept drift using entity profile with fraud feedback
So far, we have shown multiple tracking statistics which can provide com-
prehensive description to concept drift. In this subsection, we will show how
to use these statistics to construct a set of dynamic risk features and use those
features as model inputs.
Suppose {E`(X), `(X) = 1, 2, · · · } is the set of entities chosen. The dynamic
risk feature set is constructed as
Ft =

overall FRt,h,FRt,h,FRt,H ,FRt,H
FRt,h(E`(X)),FRt,h(E`(X))
FRt,H(E`(X)),FRt,H(E`(X))
WoEt,h(E`(X)),WoEt,h(E`(X))
WoEt,H(E`(X)),WoEt,H(E`(X))
` = 1, 2, · · ·

. (22)
To approximate real-time fluctuation, dynamic risk features need to be up-
dated relative frequently. Denote the pre-defined updating time stamps for
dynamic risk features as {tk : k ∈ N}. At every time stamp tk, calculate dy-
namic risk feature set Ftk based on the transactions happened within the sliding
windows (tk−h, tk) and (tk−H , tk). Later, for transactions happened within time
span [tk, tk+1), Ftk become part of the transactions attributes based on the en-
tity, as illustrated in Figure 6.
Figure 6: Attaching logic of assembling transactions.
Therefore, for a transaction with a feature x happens at time t, the FDS
provides a set of associated dynamic risk features. Since these features are
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calculated in a relative frequent fashion (difference between tk+1 and tk is small),
we can use ft and ftk indistinguishably to denote the dynamic risk features
associated with transaction feature x. Denote the assembled transaction as
x′ = (x, ft) (23)
where x′ is (p+ q)-dimensional. So p is the number of original features and q is
the number of dynamic risk feature. x and x′ refer to the same transaction. The
only difference is x′ has both dynamic risk feature and static feature describing
it, while x only has static features.
Let Ft be the collection of dynamic risk features calculated prior to time t,
i.e.
Ft = {Ftk : tk < t}. (24)
Denote M˜t as the model applied in production based on the training dataset
{Yt,Xt,Ft}. (25)
We call M˜t a “dynamic model” since it includes the dynamic risk features
Ft as training inputs. At time t + 1, for transaction x, the output score from
the dynamic model, because of assembling ft+1 as inputs, satisfies
M˜t(x′) = M˜t(x, ft+1) ∝ pt+1(x). (26)
The justification for Equation (26) comes from the indicating power of f to p
as shown in Equation (9).
By this approach, without having to update the existing model between
time t and t + 1, the dynamic model can overcome concept drift phenomenon
to predict the probability of a transaction being fraudulent at time t + 1 more
accurately.
5. Model Validation Using Real Data
Online purchase transaction data from two of Microsoft’s business partners
were used to valid our approach. Within each, we randomly select 70% trans-
actions for training and the rest 30% for testing. For the same business partner
data, static and dynamic models are trained over the same set of transactions
and evaluated on the same test dataset. FastTree, known as an efficient imple-
mentation of the MART gradient boosting algorithm [2], is used as our model
training algorithm. The configuration for dynamic model is
(i) Entity: product name, account email domain, billing country code, device
type + currency + the first three digits/letters of a SKU;
(ii) Sliding window size: 4 weeks and 8 weeks;
(iii) Dynamic feature update frequency: daily.
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Figure 7 and Figure 8 show the ROC curve comparison between static model
and dynamic model on business partner 1 and business partner 2 respectively.
ROC curves were generated from test dataset. Blue line represents the results
of the dynamic model, while orange line represents static model. These lifts
confirm that dynamic model is superior for both business partners. For partner
1, while keeping false positive rate (FPR) at 0.5% for both models, dynamic
model can increase true positive rate (TPR) by 2.23% relatively; if TPR is
controlled at 84.4%, dynamic model can reduce FPR by about 20% relatively.
For partner 2, while keeping FPR at 0.5%, dynamic model can increase TPR
by about 12.3% relatively; if TPR is controlled at 41.6%, dynamic model can
reduce FPR by about 31.1% relatively. We also found that dynamic risk features
were shown as top features with higher information values.
Figure 7: ROC curve comparison for partner 1.
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Figure 8: ROC curve comparison for partner 2.
Figure 9 shows the fraudulent transactions that dynamic model caught while
the static model missed. The red curve is fraud rate on one entity value calcu-
lated on the 4-week sliding windows, and black curve is for the 8-week sliding
windows. The system was under fraud attack on 04/06/2017 when the red line
is significantly higher. Some fraudulent transactions are shown in the right ta-
ble with their corresponding scores. D Score is the score given by the dynamic
model and S Score is given by the static model. If we have used the dynamic
score and the cutoff as 85, we could have caught most frauds which static model
missed.
Figure 9: Fraudulent transactions dynamic model catches.
Back to Figure 2, due to concept drift, static model performed much worse
than expected on offline data. On similar dataset, Figure 10 shows the degrada-
tion of model performance is much smaller for the comparison between in-time
prediction and offline validations.
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Figure 10: Performance degradation of dynamic model.
6. Discussion
Entity profile with fraud feedback is a critical feature which brings most
recent fraud patterns for dynamic models to consume. Selection of features for
the entity profile is very crucial. This selection can be treated as a problem of
partitioning the data space. If, for example, product title is the chosen entity,
the data space will be cut into pieces by the number of products. Since FR(X)
and WoE(X) are calculated for each piece, the partition of data space should
not be too coarse or too fine. If cutting too coarsely, concept drift won’t be
captured. For example, if we choose country as the major feature for entity,
it will cut the data space into USA part, Mexico part, China part, etc. The
dynamic risk features calculated on the countries will not reflect fraud target
shifting within the countries. If cutting too finely, the estimates of FR and WoE
will not be stable. How to wisely divide sample space is an interesting topic
that is worth further research.
The selection of moving window size is another important factor to consider.
We selected the long-term short-term sliding windows based on experience. It
works well but finding a systematic algorithm with an automatic window selec-
tion can be an interesting topic. We have explored long term and short term
cascade modeling which helps to build a solid model to catch new emerging
fraud patterns without impacting the detection power on existing ones.
We mainly use the ROC curves for validation of our dynamic approach to
adaptive learning, as they are often used for evaluating binary classifiers. Other
measures that related to revenue gained, or prevented losses could be interesting
from a business point of view. However, these measures may not be comparable
for different businesses.
As we mentioned in the introduction section, our approach in this paper
is a combination of active and passive strategies in handing concept drift for
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adaptive learning. We select dynamical risk features to build a light-weight
detection mechanism for fraud pattern changes using signals from the input
and out signals. The approach is validated in real operational settings and is
proved to be effective; cf.[Section 5] (Joao Gama, 2013). Although this paper
focuses on handling real concept drift as said in Subsection 2.2, our approach
works for virtual drift as well.
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